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Abstract
In this paper we study the class of claims problems where the amount to be divided 
is perfectly divisible and claims are made on indivisible units of several items. Each 
item has a price, and the available amount falls short to be able to cover all the 
claims at the given prices. We propose several properties that may be of interest in 
this particular framework. These properties represent the common principles of fair-
ness, efficiency, and non-manipulability by merging or splitting. Efficiency is our 
focal principle, which is formalized by means of two axioms: non-wastefulness and 
Pareto efficiency. We show that some combinations of the properties we consider are 
compatible, others are not.
Keywords Claims problems · Indivisible items · Equal treatment of equals · Non-
wastefulness · Manipulability
1 Introduction
Resource allocation problems have been extensively studied in the literature for 
their relevance, particularly when there is a shortage of resources. Decisions made 
about the allocation problem can lead to grievances and tough negotiations. For this 
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reason, it is interesting to know what difficulties are faced by those who have to 
make decisions about the allocation of resources, particularly when they are scarce. 
Claims problems or bankruptcy problems are one type of these resource allocation 
problems. In the classical claims problem, introduced by O’Neill (1982), a central 
authority has to decide how to divide among the creditors the liquidation value of a 
firm that goes into bankruptcy. Obviously, this liquidation value does not exceed the 
debt to the creditors.1 Usually, both the creditors’ claims and the value to be divided 
are perfectly divisible. In this work we present a novel model where the amount to 
be divided is in money (and therefore divisible) but the demands are made on indi-
visible items,2 each with an associated price. Imagine a health authority responsible 
for several hospitals that, as in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, has to allocate 
to all of them the scarce resources. Each of those hospitals will ask for several medi-
cal items (beds, ventilators, defibrillators...). Each of those items has a market price 
and the health authority has a budget with which to buy them. How many items of 
each type should be allocated to each hospital taking into consideration their claims, 
the prices and the available budget? The fact that the demands are expressed in indi-
visible units of different items, while the amount to divide is continuous, presents 
several decision difficulties that we analyze in this work.
To be more precise, in our setting, a claims problem can be condensed into five 
elements. Namely: a set of agents of the claimants, a set of possible items demanded, 
a vector of prices of those items, a matrix of claims that specifies the number of 
units each agent claims on each item, and the available amount (called estate). In 
addition, it happens that the estate falls short to be able to cover the whole claim at 
the given prices. A rule is a way in which to solve claims problems. In particular, 
we consider multi-valued functions, which may be more convenient in order to deal 
with the indivisibilities in the model.
There are other authors that have studied allocations problems with indivisibili-
ties. In some cases both the budget and the demands are integers (Chen 2015; Her-
rero and Martínez 2011, 2008a, 2008b), while in other papers the estate is indivis-
ible but the claims are continuous (Fragnelli et al. 2016, 2014). With respect to those 
works, the novelty we present is twofold. One, the claims are on multiple items. And 
two, and more significant, the existence of prices, which allow us to consider and 
combine a continuous estate with indivisible claims.
Following the axiomatic methodology, we wonder if rules exist that satisfy suit-
able combinations of properties (called axioms) that represent criteria on efficiency, 
fairness, and stability. A claims problem represents a situation where there is a 
shortage, and therefore the first requirement that comes to mind is to use the lim-
ited budget efficiently, trying to satisfy most of the claims with the least amount of 
money. We implement this principle by means of the non-wastefulness condition, 
1 Thomson (2003, 2015) are two excellent surveys on this literature.
2 We should point out that if we consider situations in which the claims are also perfectly divisible, the 
so-called multi-issue situations introduced by Calleja et al. (2005) arise.
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which simply says that we would waste as little estate as possible.3 As an alternative 
to non-wastefulness, we also analyze the Pareto efficiency condition. While the for-
mer represents efficiency from the point of view of a central authority/government 
(wasting the least of the budget), the latter takes the perspective of the agents (their 
allocation cannot be improved at the cost of worsening other individual). We also 
study other properties that implement several principles of fairness and stability. For 
the former we consider weak equal treatment of equals (agents with equal claims 
should get equal allotments), while for the latter we impose non-manipulability by 
merging or splitting (agents cannot manipulate their assignments either by splitting 
or merging their claims).
Interestingly, the finding of non-wasteful rules is closely related with a well-
known programming problem, the so-called bounded knapsack problem.4 Since the 
seminal paper by Dantzig (1957), several extensions have been widely studied due 
to their practical applications Kellerer et al. (2010), including choice theory Feuer-
man and Weiss (1973). As examples of interest which relate to our situation, Dar-
mann and Klamler (2014) study how to share the estate in a continuous setting by 
means of optimal solutions, and Arribillaga and Bergantiños (2019) analyze two 
rules related to the Shapley value of an optimistic game.
In the context of claims problems with indivisibilities, several papers have pro-
posed different type of solutions. Moulin (2000), Herrero and Martínez (2008a), 
Chen (2015) use priority methods, while Giménez-Gómez and Vilella Bach (2012) 
adopt a P-rights recursive process, described in Giménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil 
(2014), to ensure weak order preservation.5 Discrete claim models have been widely 
used to deal with scarce resources in technological problems such as mobile radio 
networks (Lucas-Estañ et al. 2012; Gozálvez et al. 2012) or social problems such as 
apportionment problems Sánchez-Soriano et al. (2016). On the other hand, in claims 
problems with multi-dimensional and perfectly divisible claims Calleja et al. (2005) 
introduce the run to the bank rule, while Bergantiños et al. (2011) present several 
characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule, and Moreno-Ternero (2009) 
studies the proportional rule.
With respect to our findings, we show that if we require non-wastefulness 
together with properties such as weak equal treatment of equals Young (1988; 1994) 
and non-manipulability (O’Neill 1982; de Frutos 1999; Ju et  al. 2007), exemp-
tion Herrero and Villar (2001), conditional full compensation (Herrero and Villar 
2002; Herrero and Martínez 2008b; securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar 2004), 
or self-duality Aumann and Maschler (1985), we end up with an impossibility. As 
for Pareto efficiency, it is also incompatible with weak equal treatment of equal and 
3 Because of the particular nature of the kind of situations we are dealing with (continuous estate and 
discrete claims) we cannot impose that the rule must exhaust the estate completely. And this is a particu-
larity of our model that differs from other works, since in the vast majority of the papers in the literature, 
both in continuous and discrete settings, the estate is completely allocated, and nothing remains.
4 Bounded knapsack problems are knapsack problems in which the variables are bounded from above.
5 This property states that if the claim of agent i is larger than the claim of agent j, she should obtain 
(lose) at least (at most) as much as agent j, and if two agents have equal claims, their amounts should dif-
fer at most by one unit.
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non-manipulability. However, this notion of efficiency is compatible with exemp-
tion, conditional full compensation, and weak securement.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Sect.  2 we set the model. In 
Sect. 3 we present the three core properties we analyze, including non-wastefulness. 
In Sect. 4 we explore the compatibility of the axioms. In Sect. 5 we study several 
protective and duality properties, and we illustrate their incompatibilities with non-
wastefulness. In Sect. 6 we analyze an alternative formulation of the efficiency prin-
ciple: Pareto efficiency. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes with a final discussion.
2  The mathematical Model
Let N = {1,… , n} be the set of agents and let H = {1,… , h} be the set of possible 
items, whose prices are given by p = (p1,… , ph) ∈ ℝh+.
A claims problem with indivisible items and different prices, or simply a prob-
lem, represents a situation in which a perfectly divisible quantity, E ∈ ℝ++ (called 
estate) must be distributed among agents in N according to their demands. Those 
demands are described by means of a matrix of claims c ∈ ℤ+ that has as many rows 
as agents, and as many columns as items
where cig ∈ ℤ+ indicates the amount of item g claimed by agent i. In any 





Therefore, a problem is given by a tuple a = (N,H, p, c,E) , where N is the set of 
agents, H is the set of items, p is the vector of prices, c is the matrix of claims, and E 
is the estate. Since the elements N, H, and p are fixed throughout the paper, when no 
confusion arises we simply write the claims problem as a = (c,E) . Let  be the set 
of all problems:
An allocation for a ∈  is a distribution of the estate among the agents that speci-
fies how many items of each price are awarded to each agent. Thus, it is a matrix 
x ∈ ℤn×h
+
 that satisfies the following two conditions: 
(a) Each agent receives a non-negative amount of each type of item, which is not 
larger than her claim: 
c =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
c11 c12 … c1h
c21 c22 … c2h
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮





a = (c,E) ∈ ℤn×h
+








0 ≤ xig ≤ cig for all i ∈ N and all g ∈ H.
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(b) The overall cost does not exceed the available estate: 
We denote by X(a) the set of all feasible allocations for the problem a ∈ .
All standard models on claims problems impose that the estate must be exhausted 
and nothing remains without being allocated. Notice that, Condition (b) relaxes 
this requirement and part of the estate may be unassigned. Otherwise, if equality is 
imposed, the set of allocations will be empty for some problems.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} , H = {1, 2, 3} , and p = (2, 4, 5) . For the problem 
a = (N,H, p, c,E) , where E = 16 and
The overall claimed amount is6
Three possible allocations for this problem are
All the three previous matrices satisfy the two conditions to be allocations of 
the problem, but they differ in that part of the estate that is wasted or non-used 
(E − ‖x ⋅ p‖) . Hence, for the null allocation x we have that ‖x ⋅ p‖ = 0 , so all the 
estate is left, for x′ , ‖x� ⋅ p‖ = 15 , so only one unit is left, while in x′′ , ‖x�� ⋅ p‖ = 16 , 
hence the estate is exhausted.
A rule is a way of selecting allocations. In our setting, it is a correspondence, 
, that selects, for each problem a ∈  , a non-empty subset of alloca-
tions R(a) ⊆ X(a).
We next present some examples of rules than can be used to solve a claims prob-
lem with indivisible items and prices.
The first rule is straightforward, it simply stipulates that no agent receives anything. 
Obviously, from a practical perspective this rule is pointless, but it is useful from a 












































6 For a given matrix A we denote by ‖A‖ the norm 1 of A, that is, the sum of all the entries of the matrix.
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theoretical point of view, since it can be used to illustrate certain problems with the 
properties of the rules.
Null rule, RN . For each a ∈  and each x ∈ X(a),
A rule is a multi-valued mapping, so it may select more than one allocation. The 
next proposal is an extreme case, since it selects the whole set of allocations X(a). It 
is the counterpart of the null rule.
Greedy rule, RG . For each a ∈ ,
Let ≻N be an ordering on the set of claimants N, where i ≻N j means i has priority 
over j. Let ≻H be an ordering on the set of items H, where f ≻H g means f has prior-
ity over g. Consider now a rule as the following modus operandi: the agents arrive 
one at a time in the ordering ≻N , and try to fully satisfy them, starting with the items 
with the highest priority in ≻H . This process continues until, eventually, the estate 
runs out. The formal definition of this rule is given below.
Agent-item priority arrival rule, RAIPA . For each a ∈  and each x ∈ X(a),
As a result of the application of this rule, agents with higher priority are satisfied 
before those with lower priority. Besides, for each agent, more relevant items are 
fully served first. Consider, for example, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
in a country whose regions (agents) are significantly heterogenous with respect to 
the pressure levels of their ICUs. It is natural to prioritize those regions with more 
pressing needs. In addition, some items (ventilators, for instance) are more critical 
than others for the patients survival. The agent-item priority arrival rule could be 
appropriate for such a kind of situations.
Several generalizations of the previous rule can be defined by, for example, con-
sidering different orderings of items for different claimants. Alternatively, instead of 
applying ≻N and then ≻H , it is also possible to do the converse.
Another rule based on priority which better captures the idea behind rules with 
similar name in other settings (see Thomson 2019) is the following. Given an order-
ing ≻N on the set of claimants, agents arrive one at a time in the ordering. The first 
agent in the ordering selects the set of items so that she maximizes the value of her 
choice subject to the budget constrained given by E. Let E1 be the remaining estate. 
Now, the second agent in the ordering selects the set of items so that she maximizes 
the value of her choice subject to the budget constrained given by E1 . We continue 
the process until the estate, eventually, runs out.
Agent priority arrival rule, RAPA . For each a ∈  and each x ∈ X(a),
Notice that, in comparison with the agent-item priority arrival rule, this rule con-
sumes more budget in each step of the process, since there is no ordering on the 
x ∈ RN(a) ⇔ xig = 0 ∀i ∈ N and ∀g ∈ H
RG(a) = X(a).
x ∈ RAIPA(a) ⇔
[
xig > 0 ⇒ xif = cif ∀f ≻H g and xjf = cjf ∀j ≻N i ∀f ∈ H
]
.
x ∈ RAPA(a) ⇔
[
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items that restricts the agent’s choice. Therefore, these two rules are suitable for 
similar situations, depending on whether some item must or must no be prioritized.
The next rule is a two-step process. First, the estate is equally divided among the 
items ( E
h
 for each one). And second, for each item, amounts as equal as possible are 
assigned to all claimants subject to no-one receiving more than her claim.7 This rule 
can be used when the central planner is interested in allocating the budget as equally 
as possible not only among the agents but also among the different items.
Equal-by-item rule, REI . For each a ∈  and each x ∈ X(a),
In the previous definition, for each possible item, the first condition states that the 
difference between the awards of two agents is no larger than 1. The second condi-
tion imposes that the overall cost of all assigned units does not exceed the share of 
the estate for this item. Finally, the third one says that the part of the estate corre-
sponding to this item is efficiently distributed, wasting as little as possible.
Several variations of the previous rule are possible. For example, we can consider 
the distribution of the estate among the items different from the uniform split. We 
can also restrict the set of allocations by introducing an ordering on N as a tie break-
ing scheme. Besides, we can obviate the third condition on the efficient usage of the 
estate.
Another interesting rule could be obtained by applying the two step process of the 
equal by item rule but to agents. Namely, some kind of equal by agent rule. For each 
agent we select a set of items whose price is smaller or equal than E
n
 and such that 
adding a new item the price is larger than E
n
 . Later the remaining budget is assigned 
to any set of agents spending as much as possible.
Equal-by-agent rule, REA . For each a ∈  and each x ∈ X(a),
where z′ > z means that there is at least one cell ig such that z′
ig
> zig , and the others 
are greater or equal; and a� = (N,H, p, c − z,E − ‖x ⋅ p‖).
x ∈ REI(a) ⇔
⎧
⎪⎨⎪⎩




















x = z + y ∈ REA(a) ⇔
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩


































7 The second step of this procedure is closely related to some other extensions in settings with indivis-
ibilities of the so-called constrained equal awards rule (Herrero and Martínez 2008a, Chen 2015).
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Example 2 Continuing with the claims problem of Example 1, these are the alloca-
tions selected by each of the rules described above. 
(a) Null rule. 
(b) Greedy rule. 
(c) Agent-item priority arrival rule. Let us suppose that the ordering ≻N and ≻H are 
such that 1 ≻N 2 ≻N 3 ≻N 4 and 3 ≻H 2 ≻H 1 . Given ≻N , we start with Agent 1. 
When this agent is fully honored, the remaining estate is 16 − (2 ⋅ 5 + 1 ⋅ 2) = 4 . 
Claimant 2 is the next in line. According to ≻H we should start by awarding her 
demand on item 3. However, the unit cost of item 3 she is claiming is 5, which 
exceeds the available estate. Then, the process stops and the allocation is the 
following: 
(d) Agent priority arrival rule. Let us suppose again that the ordering ≻N is such that 
1 ≻N 2 ≻N 3 ≻N 4 . We start with Agent 1. He is fully honored obtaining x11 = 1 
and x13 = 2 , and the remaining budget is 4. Agents 2 and 3 cannot obtain any-
thing since the items they demand have a price of 5. Finally, Agent 4 can choose 
1 unit of item 1 or 1 unit of item 2, but if we consider agents are maximizers 
of the budget allocated to them, then the only alternative is x42 = 1 . Then, the 
process ends and the rule gives the following allocation: 
 Note that if c41 had been 2 instead of 1, then RAPA(a) would have two possible 
allocations.
(e) Equal-by-item rule. First, we equally divide the estate among the items 
( E1 = E2 = E3 =
16
3
 ). We start with item 1. Since p1 = 2 , E1 is enough to fully 
cover the demands of Agents 1 and 4. The same argument applies to item 2. 
Finally, item 3 must be rationed because the cost of honoring all the demands 
exceeds the share of the estate devoted to this item. With E3 =
16
3
 we can only 
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may be assigned to any agent. Therefore, the equal-by-item rule selects the fol-
lowing allocations: 
(f) Equal-by-agent rule. First, we equally divide the estate among the agents, 16
4
= 4 . 
With this distribution of the budget there are only two alternatives 
 In the first case 12 units of the budget are left and in the second case 10 units 
are left. In both cases, the allocations spending as much as possible of the 
remaining budget are 
 Therefore, 
All the previous rules (and their possible generalizations) arise as natural ways to 
solve a claims problem with indivisible items of different prices. Some of them may be 
more appealing than others. There are rules (like the null rule) that make very ineffi-
cient usage of the available estate, which is quite undesirable in a situation of shortage. 
Other proposals may result in very ,,unfair" allocations. Thus, the priority arrival rules, 
for instance, do not take into account any minimal principle of justice. Some claimants 
are fully satisfied while others get nothing. Besides, solutions in the spirit of the equal-
by-item or the equal-by-agent rules are easily manipulated by the agents merging or 
splitting their claims. In the next sections we deliberate over the existence of rules with 

























































































+ y ∶ y ∈ Y
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
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3  Three Core Properties
In this section we present three minimal requirements a rule should satisfy, which 
are quite standard in the literature on claims problems. The restrictions they 
impose are so slight that they are usually compatible (O’Neill 1982; de Frutos 
1999; Ju et  al. 2007; Estañ et  al. 2020). The first property stipulates that in a 
rationing situation we should waste as little as possible. The second property is 
a minimal criterion on fairness, and states that agents with equal claims should 
be equally treated. Finally, the last property makes the rule immune to certain 
manipulations by the agents. To summarize, efficiency, fairness, and non-manipu-
lability will be the core requirements we impose as starting point.
As we have seen in Example 2, it may happen that not all the allocations com-
pletely exhaust the estate. Given the nature of the problem, it is natural to require 
that the rule chooses an allocation that misuses the estate as little as possible. 
This is the counterpart of the efficiency requirement in claims problems with con-
tinuous claims and estate, which states that the entire amount available should be 
allocated (see, Thomson (2003) and Thomson (2015), for example). 
Non-wastefulness For each a ∈  , if x ∈ R(a) , then there is no other alloca-
tion x� ∈ X(a) such that E − ‖x� ⋅ p‖ < E − ‖x ⋅ p‖.
The next property introduces a minimal condition of equality, imposing that 
individuals with the same claims should be treated equally. Obviously, because of 
the nature of the problem and the existence of indivisible items, complete equal-
ity is difficult to achieve (if not impossible in most cases). So, we modify the con-
dition to require that agents with equal claims must obtain allocations as equal as 
the indivisibility allows, and equal agents must have the same opportunities. That 
is, if two individuals demand the same units of all items, then (i) their allocations 
differ, at most, by one unit per item (in each allocation their awards are as equal 
as the indivisibility permits), and (ii) the set of selected allocations is symmetric 
with respect to these two agents (both have the same opportunities to receive one 
unit more than the other).
 Weak equal treatment of equals For each a ∈  and each {i, j} ⊆ N , if 
cig = cjg∀g ∈ H , then for all x ∈ R(a) it holds that
• for all g ∈ H , |xig − xjg| ≤ 1 , and
• for each g ∈ H , there is x� ∈ R(a) , such that x�
ig
= xjg , x�jg = xig and the rest of 
cells of x′ are the same as in x.
Finally, the next principle says that the rule is immune to manipulation. More 
precisely, it states that agents cannot manipulate the allocation by either merging 
or splitting their demands. If a group of individuals merge into a single claimant 
whose demand (for each item) is the sum of the demands of all the members of 
such a group, then the allocation of this phantom claimant should coincide with 
the aggregate allocation the group would have obtained if they had concurred 
separately. Dually, if an agent splits into a group of different individuals, the 
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aggregate allocation should coincide with the allotment this single agent would 
have received.8
Before formalizing the axiom, we must point out that we are working with cor-
respondences, which means that the outcome of a rule is a set of allocations. There-
fore, comparing two outcomes requires comparing two sets, and several possibilities 
arise: S = T  , S ⊆ T  , or T ⊆ S . From those alternatives, non-manipulability by merg-
ing or splitting states that (1) for each allocation in the shrunk problem (the problem 
with the phantom agent) there must exist a corresponding allocation in the expanded 
problem (without the phantom agent), and (2), for each allocation in the expanded 
problem there must exist a corresponding allocation in the shrunk problem. 
Non-manipulability by merging or splitting For each (N, c,E), (N�, c�,E) ∈  





j∈N�N� cjg for all g ∈ H
2. c�
jg
= cjg for all j ∈ N��{i} and for all g ∈ H,
then 












Note that the definition of non-manipulability by merging or splitting states that any 
allocation that a group of agents could receive through their merger could also have 
been obtained by remaining separate, and conversely, any allocation that a group of 
agents could receive by remaining separate could also have obtained through their 
merger.
4  Compatibility Results
In the previous section, we have formalized three basic properties that implement 
principles of efficiency, fairness, and non-manipulability. Now, we explore their 
compatibility, that is, we analyze if rules exist that satisfy all or some of those 
properties.
Given a problem a ∈  . Consider the following integer linear programming prob-
lem (ILP, for short):
8 It was first studied in O’Neill (1982) with the name strategy-proofness, and analyzed in works as de 
Frutos (1999) or Ju et al. (2007).
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or equivalently,
Let us denote by ILP(a) the set of all optimal solutions for the program in (1). It is 
easy to observe that a rule R satisfies non-wastefulness if it is a selection of solutions 
of the previous optimization problem, i.e., R(a) ⊆ ILP(a) for all a ∈  . The integer 
linear program defined by (1) belongs to the class of bounded knapsack problems.9 
Since the seminal paper by Dantzig (1957) several extensions have been widely 
studied due to their practical applications ( Kellerer et  al. 2010). In general, the 
solutions of a bounded knapsack problem cannot be obtained in polynomial time. 
Besides, most of the algorithms are heuristic, and they are usually unable to find all 
the possible allocations. In other words, finding the set of non-wasteful allocations 
of the claims problem (and therefore the goal of efficiency) is a very hard task, if not 
impossible. However, despite these technical difficulties, the following results shows 
that some interesting conclusions can be derived.
Theorem 1 There are rules that satisfy non-wastefulness, weak equal treatment of 
equals and non-manipulability by merging or splitting if and only if there are rules 
that satisfy those properties for the subclass of problems with |H| = 1.
Proof It is obvious that if there are rules that satisfy non-wastefulness, weak equal 
treatment of equals and non-manipulability by merging or splitting then those rules 
satisfy those properties for the subclass of problems with |H| = 1.
Conversely, let us suppose that there are rules that satisfy non-wastefulness, weak 
equal treatment of equals and non-manipulability by merging or splitting for the 
subclass of problems with |H| = 1 . Let R be one of those rules, then we define the 
































0 ≤ xig ≤ cig, ∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈ H
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
9 Notice that the constrains 0 ≤ xig ≤ cig, ∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈ H restrict the possible values of the optimization 
variables, and therefore the knapsack problem is bounded.
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First, we consider the bankruptcy problem b(a) = (N, d, u,E) given by
• The set of claimants N = H , i.e the claimants are the different types of items.
• dg = pg
∑
i∈N cig , for all g ∈ H , i.e. the claim of item g is exactly the total amount 
claimed by all agents for the item g.
• u is a vector of utility functions defined for each g ∈ N = H as follows: 
 where ⌊r⌋ is the integer part of r ∈ ℝ.
• Finally, the estate E is exactly the same as in a = (N,H, p, c,E) ∈ .
This bankruptcy problem is closely related to those studied in Gozálvez et  al. 
(2012), Lucas-Estañ et al. (2012) and Carpente et al. (2013), in which the agents are 
considered to have different utility functions in the sense that the same part of the 
estate has different degrees of satisfaction for the claimants. In our particular case, 
for example, Claimant 1 must receive at least p1 units of the estate to obtain one 
level of satisfaction, i.e. one item of type 1 ∈ H , and this can be different for each 
claimant g ∈ N = H.
Second, we distribute the estate E amongst the claimants N = H by solving the 
following linear program:
Note that every optimal solution of the integer linear program defined by (1) results 
in a feasible solution of the linear program defined by (2), and this must be optimal 
because, otherwise, we would be able to find a better solution for the problem given 
in (1) from an optimal solution of the problem given in (2). We denote by LP(b(a)) 
the set of all optimal solutions x̄ of the linear program given by (2) such that 
ȳg
pg
∈ ℤ+,∀g ∈ N .
Third, for every optimal solution ȳ ∈ LP(b(a)) , we consider the family of prob-
lems āg = (N,H = {g}, pg, cg, ȳg) , where cg = (c1g,… , cng).
Finally, for each problem āg we consider R(āg) . The set of allocations given by 

















0 ≤ yg ≤ pg
n�
i=1











 denotes the Cartesian product.
This procedure provides a rule R̄ which satisfies non-wastefulness, weak equal 
treatment of equals and non-manipulability by merging or splitting. Indeed, by defi-
nition and taking into account that R satisfies non-wastefulness and weak equal treat-
ment of equals, R̄ satisfies non-wastefulness and weak equal treatment of equals too.
Let a = (N,H, p, c,E), a� = (N�,H, p, c�,E) ∈  with N′ ⊂ N such that for i ∈ N� 





j∈N�N� cjg for all g ∈ H
2. c�
jg
= cjg for all j ∈ N��{i} and for all g ∈ H
First of all, note that LP(b(a)) = LP(b(a�)) . Now let x� ∈ R̄(a�) , then there is an opti-




) for all g ∈ H . Since LP(b(a)) = LP(b(a�)) and R 
satisfies non-manipulability by merging or splitting, then for each g ∈ H there is an 
xg ∈ R(āg) such that x�ig = xig +
∑
j∈N�N� xjg . The proof of the second condition is 
analogous. Therefore, R̄ satisfies non-manipulability by merging or splitting.   ◻
The previous result states that, if we are able to obtain rules that satisfy the three 
conditions in a reduced domain of problems (with just one item), then they can be 
extended to the general domain. And conversely, if the three properties are not com-
patible when |H| = 1 , then they are not compatible in general. Theorem 2 exploits 
this relation to conclude that, in this setting, it is not possible to find a rule that 
fulfills non-wastefulness, weak equal treatment of equals and non-manipulability by 
merging or splitting.
Theorem 2 There is no rule that satisfies non-wastefulness, weak equal treatment of 
equals and non-manipulability by merging or splitting.
Proof Let us consider a = (N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},H = {1}, p = (1), c = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5),E = 4) , 
and a rule R that satisfies non-wastefulness, non-manipulability by merg-
ing or splitting, and weak equal treatment of equals. Let us consider 
a� =
(
N� = {1, 6},H = {1}, p = (1), c� = (5, 5),E = 4
)
 , in this case by non-waste-
fulness and weak equal treatment of equals R(a�) = {(2, 2)}.
Now, let us consider
in this case, by non-wastefulness and weak equal treatment of equals R(a��) is the 
set of all possible 0-1 vectors, such that the sum of their coordinates is 4. Therefore, 
by non-manipulability by splitting the allocation (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4) belongs to R(a). 
Again, by non-manipulability by splitting R(a�) = {(2, 2)} is the unique result and 
the impossibility of x�
1
= 0 is more evident.   ◻
Theorem  2 provides a surprising result, since it states an incompatibility 
among some principles that are compatible in the classical claims problem (see 
Thomson (2019)). Notice that none of the properties in the previous result is very 
a�� = (N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10},H = {1}, p = (1),
c = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1),E = 4),
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demanding by itself. Indeed, the next propositions show that any pairwise com-
bination of non-wastefulness, weak equal treatment of equals and non-manipula-
bility by merging or splitting is feasible. Besides, the set of rules that satisfy each 
pairwise combination of properties is so wide that it does not seem to have a clear 
structure.
Proposition 1 There are rules that satisfy non-wastefulness and weak equal treat-
ment of equals together.
Proof To prove the result is sufficient to show that there is at least one rule sat-
isfying these two properties for each a ∈  . We define the following rule 
WE(a) = ILP(a) ∩ E(a) for each a ∈  , where E(a) is the set of all weak equal treat-
ment of equals allocations in X(a). Now we only need to prove that WE(a) is always 
nonempty for each a ∈ .
Let a = (N,H, p, c,E) ∈  and let i, j ∈ N be such that cig = cjg for all g ∈ H . 





| > 1 . Now we consider the following allocation:
where given r ∈ ℝ , ⌊r⌋ is the integer part of r, ⌈r⌉ is the lowest integer larger than or 
equal to r, and m{r} is the fractional part of r.
Finally, it is easy to check that x� ∈ ILP(a) and, obviously, also x� ∈ E(a) , there-
fore x� ∈ WE(a) . Now, since ILP(a) ≠ ∅ and E(a) ≠ ∅ for each a ∈  , WE(a) ≠ ∅ 
for each a ∈  .   ◻
Proposition 2 There are rules that satisfy non-wastefulness and non-manipulability 
by merging or splitting together.
Proof To prove the result is sufficient to show that for each a ∈  , the set ILP(a) 
satisfies non-manipulability by merging or splitting.
Let a = (N,H, p, c,E), a� = (N�,H, p, c�,E) ∈  with N′ ⊂ N , and let i ∈ N� such 





j∈N�N� cjg for all g ∈ H
2. c�
jg
= cjg for all g ∈ H and for all j ∈ N��{i}.
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) is the application of the greatest remainder 
method10 to distribute x′
ig





 . Now, it is easy to 
check that this allocation x belongs to ILP(a).
Conversely, let x ∈ ILP(a) , then we define for each j ∈ N� and for each g ∈ H , 
the following allocation:
Again, it is easy to check that this allocation x′ belongs to ILP(a�) . Therefore, the 
rule RILP(a) = ILP(a) for each a ∈  satisfies non-wastefulness and non-manipula-
bility by merging or splitting.   ◻
Proposition 3 There are rules that satisfy weak equal treatment of equals and non-
manipulability by merging or splitting together.
Proof The null rule satisfies both non-manipulability by merging or splitting and 
weak equal treatment of equals.   ◻
5  Protective Properties and Duality
In this section we study the compatibility between the non-wastefulness condition 
and other standard properties required when solving claims problems. In particular, 
we focus on requirements that protect small claimants. In some cases these proper-
ties establish the conditions under which an agent has such a small claim that she 
should be excluded from rationing. In other cases they guarantee a minimum amount 
of resources to each individual.
Consider an agent i, and replace any other agent’s claim (for all the items) by the 
claim of agent i. Imagine that in the new problem resulting from this replacement 
the overall demand does not exceed the available estate. Exemption states that, in 
such a case, the claim of i is so small that she is not responsible for the shortage, and 
she should be excluded from rationing. This is, i should receive her claim.11


















xjg if j ∈ N
� and j ≠ i,
xig +
∑
k∈N�N� xkg if j = i.
11 This property was introduced by Herrero and Villar (2001).
10 This is a well-known method in apportionment problems also known as the method of largest frac-
tions or the Hare Quota method (see, for instance, Lucas (1982)). The integer budget is distributed pro-
portionally to the integer claims, if the allocation is integer for all claimants that is the final allocation, if 
not, each claimant receives the integer part of his allocation, and an extra unit is allocated to the claim-
ants with the highest fractional parts until the estate is exhausted.
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then, for any x ∈ R(a) , xig = cig ∀g ∈ H.
The next property applies a different criterion to determine when an agent has 
a small claim. Consider an agent i, and replace any other agent’s claim (for all the 
items) by the minimum between her claim and the claim of agent i. Imagine that 
in the new problem resulting from this replacement the overall demand does not 
exceed the available estate. Conditional full compensation states that, in such a case, 
agent i should be excluded from rationing and receive her whole claim.12
Conditional full compensation For each a ∈  and each i ∈ N , if
then, for any x ∈ R(a) , xig = cig ∀g ∈ H , where N−i =
�









Notice that exemption implies conditional full compensation, and both properties 
coincide when |N| = 2.
Theorem 3 There is no rule that satisfies non-wastefulness and conditional full com-
pensation together.
Proof Let R be a rule that satisfies both properties in the statement of the theorem. 
Let us consider the problem where N = {1, 2, 3} , H = {1, 2} , p = (3, 7) , E = 35 , and
For Claimant 3 we have that N−
3






pgcjg + (3 − �N−3 �)∑2
g=1
pgc3g = 30 ≤ 35 . Since the rule satisfies conditional full compensation, it must 
happen that x31 = x32 = 1 , which is not compatible with non-wastefulness. Indeed, if 
x31 = x32 = 1 then 25 units of estate remains. But this remaining estate cannot be 
allocated to Agents 1 and 2 fulfilling non-wastefulness, because the unique positive 
and integer linear combination of the numbers p1 = 3 and p2 = 7 is 6p1 + 1p2 = 25 . 
However, this would imply to assign 6 units of the first item, which exceeds the joint 
claim of Agents 1 and 2.   ◻
As a consequence of the previous result, neither exemption and non-wasteful-
ness are compatible. Theorem 3 illustrates that, for the problem of adjudicating 
conflicting indivisible claims with different prices, efficiency (non-wastefulness) 
























12 This requirement is called sustainability in Herrero and Villar (2002).
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cannot be conciliated. It is worth noting that this impossibility is a particular-
ity of the model with several items and prices. Both when claims and estate are 
divisible, and when they are expressed in indivisible units these two properties 
are compatible ( Herrero and Martínez (2008a)).
The next property, called securement, was introduced by Moreno-Ternero and 
Villar (2004) and guarantees a minimal share to every agent. More precisely, it 
imposes two conditions. One, an individual holding a feasible claim (the value of 
her demand at the prices of the items is below the estate) should receive alloca-
tions whose value is, at least, one nth of the value of her claim. And two, an indi-
vidual holding an unfeasible claim (the value of her demand at the prices of the 
items is above the estate) should receive allocations whose value is, at least, one 
nth of the estate.
Securement For each a ∈  , each x ∈ R(a) , and each i ∈ N
Example 3 Let us consider the problem where N = {1, 2, 3} , H = {1, 2} , p = (2, 4) , 
E = 10 , and
For any agent i ∈ N , securement implies that 2xi1 + 4xi2 ≥
10
3
 . Besides, by the defi-
nition of a rule, it must happen that 2(x11 + x21 + x31) + 4(x12 + x22 + x32) ≤ 10 with 
xig ∈ ℤ+ , but this is impossible.
The previous example illustrates that securement, as it is defined above, cannot 
be directly applied to this model because it is incompatible with the definition of 
a rule itself. The main reason is that the lower bound securement imposed is too 
high. Therefore, it must be definitively discarded.
In the spirit of securement, the next criterion guarantees to each agent a mini-
mum amount that, at the same time, is also compatible with the existence of fea-
sible allocations. To this end, we look for the largest lower bound of the value of 
the allocation of any agent i ∈ N . That is, we are looking for a value i such that 
(i) we can impose that 
∑h
g=1
pgxig ≥ i (in the line of securement), (ii) i is com-
patible with the existence of feasible allocations, and (iii) if i increases by an 
infinitely small amount  ∈ ℝ++ then the impossibility emerges again.







































, ∀i ∈ N.
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This is the explanation in detail of the previous alternative definition of securement. 












because otherwise we have impossibility. So, among those allocations that generate 
feasibility, we take those in which the claimant obtains the largest possible value. 
Thus, weak securement can be applied to this model without the issues originated by 
the standard definition of securement.
The next result shows that, however, when non-wastefulness is required in con-
junction with weak securement, an impossibility emerges.
Theorem  4 There is no rule that satisfies non-wastefulness and weak securement 
together.
Proof Let R be a rule that satisfies both properties in the statement of the theorem. 
Let us consider the problem where N = {1, 2, 3} , H = {1, 2} , p = (3, 7) , E = 14 , and
Since R satifies non-wastefulness we have that
Notice that, in any allocation x ∈ R(a) the third agent does not receive any unit of any 
item. And hence, 3x31 + 7x32 = 0 . This implies, because of weak securement, that 
3y31 + 7y32 = 0 for all y ∈ X(a) such that 3y31 + 7y32 ≤
1
3




Which is not true.   ◻
The last of the criteria, called self-duality, was formulated by Aumann and 
Maschler (1985). It states that the problem of dividing profits should be solved sym-
metrically to the problem of dividing losses. Before defining the property we intro-
duce the dual problem of a claim problem. Given a = (c,E) ∈  , the associated 
dual problem of a is given by ad = (c,L) ∈  , where L = ‖c ⋅ p‖ − E.
Self-duality For each a ∈  it holds that R(a) = c − R(ad).
Proposition 4 If a rule satisfies the self-duality property then it exhausts the estate.
Proof Let R be a rule that is self-dual but does not exhaust the estate. Then, for a 
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In application of self-duality, xd = c − x ∈ R(ad) . However,
In other words, since ‖xd ⋅ p‖ > L , the allocation xd is not feasible and hence we 
have a contradiction. Therefore, if R is self-dual then the estate must be completely 
used.   ◻
The converse of Proposition 4 is not true in general. For example, if we consider 
the class of problems with H = {1} and p1 = 1 and E a positive integer number, then 
the discrete constrained equal awards rule (see, for example, Herrero and Martínez 
(2008a)) always exhaust the estate but does not satisfies self-duality.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4 is that there can be no rules that sat-
isfy the property of self-duality, since no rule can always exhaust the estate, in gen-
eral. Notice that, unlike the other results in this section, the lack of self-dual rules is 
absolute, and the principle of non-wastefulness plays no role in that.
6  An Alternative to Non‑Wastefulness: Pareto Efficiency
As we have already mentioned, most of the models on claims problems assume that 
the estate must be fully distributed and nothing must remain. This requirement is 
called balance by Thomson (2019), but it is also known as efficiency (Thomson 
(2003), de Mesnard (2015)). It is quite obvious that this principle cannot be directly 
applied to our setting. In the previous sections we have interpreted this requirement 
from the point of view of a central authority whose goal is to do the most with the 
least, focusing on the use of the budget and trying to minimize the wasted estate. 
However, we have found this requirement to be very demanding and not compatible 
with many reasonable properties.
In this section we explore an alternative formulation of the efficiency principle: 
Pareto efficiency. In contrast with non-wastefulness, this property focuses on the 
agents’ allocations rather than on the expenditure of the budget. An allocation is 
Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation in which some individual is better off 
and no individual is worse off.
Definition 1 For a ∈  , x ∈ X(a) is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation 







g∈H pgxig,∀i ∈ N , with at least one strict 
inequality.
Given a ∈  , we denote by P(a) ⊂ X(a) the set of all allocations which are Pareto 
efficient.
Pareto efficiency For a ∈  , R(a) ⊆ P(a).
Notice that it is glaringly obvious that non-wastefulness implies Pareto efficiency, 


















pgxig > ‖cp‖ − E = L
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in general, it is not difficult to prove that they coincide when |H| = 1 . As a conse-
quence, we can replace non-wastefulness by Pareto efficiency in Theorem 1, which 
implies that weak equal treatment of equals and non-manipulability by merging or 
splitting together are incompatible with Pareto efficiency. This result is the analo-
gous to Theorem 2.
Theorem 5 There is no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency, weak equal treatment of 
equals and non-manipulability by merging or splitting.
Since Pareto efficiency is milder than non-wastefulness, we obtain the counter-
parts of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 5 There are rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and weak equal treat-
ment of equals together.
Proposition 6 There are rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and non-manipulability 
by merging or splitting together.
With regard to self-duality, it is evident that it will not be compatible with Pareto 
efficiency, since the latter does not guarantee that the estate is fully exhausted. The-
orems 3 and 4 state that conditional full compensation and weak securement are 
incompatible with non-wastefulness. However, the next two results show that, if the 
latter requirement is weakened to Pareto efficiency, then the possibility emerges.
Theorem 6 There are rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and conditional full com-
pensation together.
Proof In order to prove this result is sufficient to show that there is at least one 
rule satisfying both properties. Given a problem a = (N,H, p, c,E) , we proceed as 
follows:
• The agents are ordered according to their claims on the budget in this way, 













• Let i0 be an agent in the previous order such that the following inequalities hold 
 and, for each k ∈ N such that i0 ∈ N−k  , 
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 Moreover, we denote by N0 =
{
i ∈ N ∶ i ⪯ i0
}
 . Note that N0 is independent of 
the chosen agent i0.
• Let x0 be the following allocation, x0
ig
= cig,∀g ∈ H , if i ∈ N0 , and 
x0
ig
= 0,∀g ∈ H , otherwise.
We define X0(a) = {x ∈ X(a)||x − x0 ∈ X(a)} . Now, we define the following rule
where a� =
�
N,H, p, c − x0,E − ‖x0 ⋅ p‖�.
By definition this rule satisfies Pareto efficiency and conditional full compensa-
tion.   ◻
Theorem  7 There are rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and weak securement 
together.
Proof Again, to prove this result is sufficient to show that there is at least one rule 
satisfying both properties. Given a problem a = (N,H, p, c,E) , we proceed as 
follows:
First, we consider the set XWS(a) ⊂ X(a) given by
Now, we define the following rule
By definition RS satisfies weak securement and Pareto efficiency. Furthermore, this 
rule is nonempty. Indeed, consider REA(a) that we know it is nonempty. If there is an 
allocation x ∈ REA(a) that is Pareto efficient, then x ∈ RS(a) . Otherwise, for each 







g∈H pgxig,∀i ∈ N , with at 
least one strict inequality, but this x� ∈ XWS(a) . If x′ is not Pareto efficient, we can 










,∀i ∈ N , with at least one 
strict inequality. Furthermore,
Now, since X(a) is a finite set there exists K > 0 such that any positive improve-
ment of an agent from one allocation to another is larger than or equal to K, i.e., K 










RC(a) = x0 + ILP(a�),
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to another. Therefore, since E is finite the above chain of allocations cannot be con-
tinued indefinitely, so that there will be an allocation in XWS(a) that it is Pareto effi-
cient.   ◻
Therefore, Pareto efficiency is a sufficiently less demanding property to be 
compatible with other reasonable properties. Furthermore, we can define rules 




N,H, p, c − x0,E − ‖x0 ⋅ p‖� , satisfies Pareto efficiency, conditional full 
compensation, and weak securement.
Consider the rule RCES defined as follows. For each, a ∈ ,
This rule satisfies Pareto efficiency, weak equal treatment of equals, conditional full 
compensation, and weak securement. The converse is not true, there are rules dif-
ferent from RCES that also fulfill these four properties. However, any rule that satis-
fies Pareto efficiency, weak equal treatment of equals, conditional full compensation, 
and weak securement must be a subselection of RCES.
Theorem 8 If a rule R satisfies Pareto efficiency, weak equal treatment of equals, 
conditional full compensation, and weak securement, then R(a) ⊆ RCES(a) , ∀a ∈ .
Proof Let R be a rule satisfying Pareto efficiency, equal treatment of equals, con-
ditional full compensation, and weak securement. Let a ∈  and x ∈ R(a) . Since 
R satisfies conditional full compensation, x can be written as x0 + (x − x0) so that 
(x − x0) ∈ X0(a).
Since R satisfies weak securement, we have that for each i such that 
x0
ig
= 0,∀g ∈ H,
otherwise, by conditional full compensation x0
ig
= cig,∀g ∈ H . Moreover, R satisfies 
Pareto efficiency. Therefore, x ∈ RCS(a).
Finally, since R satisfies weak equal treatment of equals, x ∈ E(a) . Therefore, 
x ∈ RCS(a) ∩ E(a) = RCES(a) .   ◻
We finish with a table that summarizes the properties each rule in Sect. 2 sat-
isfies (Table 1).
RCS(a) = x0 + RS(a�),∀a ∈ ,
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7  Discussion
In this paper we have studied a particular class of claims problems. In our model 
a group of agents demand several units of different items, each of which has a 
price. The available estate is not sufficient to satisfy the aggregate claim. A rule 
is a multi-valued function that selects a set of allocations, which indicate the 
amount of units of each item that is assigned to each claimant.
In contrast with other models involving claims problems, efficiency cannot be 
guaranteed. The closest requirement is non-wastefulness, which states that the 
rule should waste as little estate as possible, and is closely related to the so-called 
bounded knapsack problem, whose solutions, in general, are difficult to obtain. 
Even though, with this milder condition of efficiency, we find that there is no 
rule that satisfies non-wastefulness together with other criteria that protect small 
agents or ensure claimants receive a minimum allocation.
In view of all the impossibility results obtained in this work, we can observe 
that it is not easy to reconcile efficiency (via non-wastefulness) with fairness. At 
the point we can follow to different paths. First, we contemplate an alternative 
notion of efficiency that weakens non-wastefulness. Or second, we reconsider the 
absolute necessity of the non-wastefulness property and simply guarantee that the 
maximum amount of estate is distributed, while respecting certain properties of 
fairness in the distribution. With regard to the first possibility, in Sect. 6 we ana-
lyze the implications of Pareto efficiency as a milder requirement of efficiency. 
Even though some impossibilities persist, we find out that Pareto efficiency is 
compatible with protective properties, in contrast with non-wastefulness. As for 
the second possibility, it is a promising research line which is beyond the objec-
tives of this paper.
Finally, we should acknowledge there are several extensions of the model 
that are not addressed in this work. For example, Carpente et al. (2013) consider 
that, in addition to the claims, each agent is endowed with an utility function. In 
our model we obviate the latter element, which may be relevant in some situa-
tions. However, we do not expect that the addition of utilities as in Carpente et al. 
(2013) alters the main conclusions significantly, which rely on the discreteness 
of the claims (or, eventually, the utility of those claims) and on the multi-valued 
rules. For instance, with respect to non-wastefulness, the solution to the opti-
mization problem in Equation (1) would take different values, but the structure 
(and implications) of the optimization program itself will still be the same. It is 
also worth mentioning that we do not provide any characterization in this paper. 
This is a very natural and convenient extension of this work, which we leave for 
further research. In contrast with other models in the literature, we define a rule 
as a correspondence, instead of a single-valued function. This change adds an 
extra layer of complexity both to the rules and to the axioms. When we try to 
extend the axioms from functions to correspondences many alternative arise. 
Think, for example, in properties that compares the outcome of two or more dif-
ferent problems: additivity, composition, monotonicity, consistency, etc. When 
rules are single-valued functions the comparison between two outcomes ( x = y 
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or x ≤ y ) is straightforward. When rules are multi-valued functions, as they are in 
our model, the comparison between two outcomes is not so evident ( R(a) = R(a�) , 
R(a) ⊂ R(a�) , R(a�) ⊂ R(a) , etc). That is, each axiom may have different and natu-
ral extensions. In this paper we have focused on the implications of one primary 
requirement: efficiency. Other principles and their consequences deserve a deeper 
analysis, which exceeds the purposes of this paper.
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